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Agency Costs in International Human Rights
DAVID H. MOORE*
This Article asserts that the international human rights
system supported by the United Nations can be viewed
productively as a network of agency relationships
between individuals, whose interests the system is
designed to safeguard, and three main agents: states,
the United Nations, and non-governmental
organizations. Each of these agency relationships
imposes costs, as each agent has interests that conflict
with those of individuals and possesses greater
information than do individuals. Applying an agency
perspective helps identify agency costs and suggests
ways in which they might be reduced. An agency
perspective also offers a new paradigm for viewing the.
human rights system, in which the interests of
individuals assume a more central role. As a result, an
agency perspective makes both conceptual and
practical contributions to international human rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Violations of international human rights are disturbingly
commonplace. Reflexively, the weakness of the international human
rights system might be blamed on the absence of an international
government that can effectively monitor and enforce human rights
compliance.' While international standard setting has been highly
successful, international monitoring and enforcement remain
relatively weak. When evaluated against the standard of domestic
governments, the international human rights system supported by the
U.N. is likely to be characterized as a fledgling government at best.2
The General Assembly provides a type of legislative body, as do U.N.
treaty-drafting conferences. Yet, the General Assembly's enactments
1. Louis Henkin has noted that "international law is often described as 'primitive' as
it tends to rely on consent rather than authoritative regulation, and that enforcement of human
rights is often perceived, though perhaps wrongly, as particularly primitive. Louis Henkin,
Human Rights and State "Sovereignty," 25 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 31, 35, 41-43
(1995/1996). Although the influence of the international human rights system continues to
grow, the system nonetheless lacks the compulsory authority that domestic governments tend
to possess, rendering the system amenable to the criticism that its shortcomings derive from
this lack of compulsory power.
2. See Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1110, 1119, 1120, 1122 (1982) (conceding that while "the international legal
system is not devoid of courts" or enforcement through retaliation, "there is a 'lack of
enforcement mechanisms of the hierarchical type"') (citation omitted). This is not to suggest
that traditional government is the only way the human rights system might exert influence.
The U.N. human rights system can facilitate global governance without becoming a
traditional government. Cf Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Liberal Agenda for Peace:
International Relations Theory and the Future of the United Nations, 4 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 377, 380, 408-10 (1994) (distinguishing between world government and
global governance). Nonetheless, much attention has been paid to creating international
governmental structures while the lessons of an agency perspective have been neglected.
This Article corrects that failing by focusing on the lessons of an agency perspective, without
rejecting either the government or governance approaches, as neither of these approaches is
entirely at odds with an agency perspective.
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generally do not create binding law in and of themselves,3 nor are the
treaties created by drafting conferences compulsory unless ratified by
individual states and then they are generally only compulsory as to
those states. 4 The Secretariat, with its High Commissioner for Human
Rights, and the Security Council fulfill executive functions.
However, the Security Council's unique power to enforce
international law5 is bound by highly political and often crippling
procedural arrangements.6 Various organs, including the International
Criminal Court ("ICC"), the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"),8
the Human Rights Commission (the "Commission"), and the Human
3. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 10-14 (The General Assembly "may make
recommendations" to member states or to the Security Council.). But cf LORI FISLER
DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 145-46 (4th ed. 2001) (noting that General
Assembly "resolutions, declarations or decisions may be considered by governments and
courts or arbitral tribunals as evidence of international custom or as expressing (and
evidencing) a general principle of law"); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 815, 839 (1997) (noting that "[i]ntemational and U.S. courts now rely on General
Assembly resolutions, multilateral treaties, and other international pronouncements as
evidence of [customary international law]").
4. But cf Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 12-13,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (authorizing the
International Criminal Court ("ICC") to exercise jurisdiction over (1) a national of a non-
state party who commits a crime within the territory of a state party, and (2) a national of a
non-state party who commits a crime referred to the ICC by the Security Council); U.N.
CHARTER art. 108 (establishing that successful amendments to the U.N. Charter may bind
member states who do not ratify the amendment).
5. 1 use enforcement here in a traditional sense to refer to the ability to bring
compulsory power to bear to effect compliance. Clearly, institutions that do not have the
Security Council's enforcement power can nonetheless influence states to comply with
international law.
6. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1 (designating certain states as permanent
members); id. art. 27, para. 3 (requiring the permanent members to concur in votes on all
non-procedural matters).
7. The ICC is not an organ of the U.N., but the Rome Statute establishing the Court
requires that the Court "be brought into relationship with the United Nations." Rome Statute,
supra note 4, art. 2. A relationship agreement between the ICC and the U.N. was adopted by
the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute in September 2002. See Report of the
Assembly of States Parties, ICC, 1st Sess., at 5-6, 243, ICC Doc. ASP/l/3 (2002), available
at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/aspfra.htm.
8. The ICJ hears disputes only between states who have accepted the court's
jurisdiction. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, 59 Stat.
1055, 1060, T.I.A.S. No. 993, at 30, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html. States often lack incentive to bring human rights claims
against one another. See Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, in
IV COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 251-54
(1989). Moreover, the ICJ ultimately must rely on the Security Council to enforce its
judgments. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94. Unsurprisingly, the ICJ has not been very influential
in the development of international human rights norms. See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP
ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 597-98 (2d
ed. 2000).
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Rights Committee,9 adjudicate human rights issues to varying
degrees. Yet, these bodies have limited jurisdiction and most lack the
authority that might support fulsome adjudicative procedures or
compulsory orders.
In the face of these limitations, human rights advocates have
naturally sought more advanced international institutions that could
legislate, execute, and adjudicate like domestic institutions. Since the
international political system rests on the bedrock of state
sovereignty,' ° even if that bedrock is crumbling," authoritative
international institutions are difficult to establish and raise their own
concerns. As a result, rather than focus on the international human
rights regime as a nascent government or even as a system of less
formal governance, this Article proposes that we conceive of the
human rights system as a network of agency relationships between the
individuals whose rights the system is designed to protect and various
international actors. The Article describes three main agency
relationships that comprise the system, identifies costs that these
agency relationships impose, and explores ways in which these costs
might be minimized. In so doing, the Article demonstrates how an
agency-based conception of the human rights system can improve the
regime's responsiveness to the individuals that it safeguards.
II. AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS AND AGENCY COSTS
"An agency relation is one in which a 'principal' delegates
authority to an 'agent' to perform some service for the principal."' 2
9. See Mark Gibney, On the Need for an International Civil Court, 26 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 47, 55 (2002) (noting that, although the Human Rights Committee is evolving
into a more judicial body, it nonetheless "does not hear oral testimony and its adjudicatory
powers are limited to expressing the 'views' of the committee"); cf ANNE BAYEFSKY, THE
UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: UNIVERSALITY AT THE CROSSROADS 33 (2001) (arguing
that parties to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights ("ICCPR") are bound by the Human Rights Committee's views regarding violations,
but recognizing that "[a]s of July 2000, states parties have submitted satisfactory follow-up
replies to the Committee's views in only 21% of cases disclosing a violation of the
[ICCPR]").
10. See Karsten Nowrot, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of Non-
Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 579,
641-42 (1999).
11. Even if sovereignty is less secure than it used to be, "international law and
international institutions ... are still largely premised on a world in which states have the last
word." Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161, 162 (2002).
12. Edgar Kiser, Comparing Varieties of Agency Theory in Economics, Political
Science, and Sociology: An Illustration from State Policy Implementation, 17 Soc. THEORY
146, 146 (1999); see also Trond Petersen, The Economics of Organization: The Principal-
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More broadly, "[w]henever one individual depends on the action of
another, an agency relationship arises."' 3  Agency relationships
abound in the world: legislators representing constituents, employees
representing employers, and lawyers representing clients.'
4
These relationships serve valuable purposes. Agency
relationships both allow many individuals to speak through one
person and allow one individual to act through many persons. The
resulting specialization allows individuals to accomplish more than
they could accomplish alone. For example, representative
government permits individual constituents to leave day-to-day
governance to their political representatives while retaining a voice in
the governance process. Employment relationships allow an
employer to work through a potentially unlimited number of
employees. Corporate structures take advantage of dual agency
relationships, permitting shareholders to leave corporate governance
to a body of specialized agents while allowing the corporation to
employ countless individuals to accomplish corporate goals. Legal
representation permits a party to navigate the judicial system without
attending law school, passing the bar, or turning full attention to the
litigation. Agency relationships thus create important efficiencies.
At the same time, agency relationships impose certain costs on
the principal. 5 The Democratic constituent committed to social
welfare is represented by a Republican congressman determined to
reduce federal involvement. An employee working on commission
seeks to maximize sales while risking the long-term satisfaction and
loyalty of the business's customers. An accident victim interested in
a large recovery is represented by an attorney who forgoes work that
only marginally would increase the award on which her contingency
fee will be based. In each of these situations, the principal and agent
have conflicting interests. The principals' interests are slighted as the
agents pursue their own interests.
Agent Relationship, 36 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 277, 277 (1993).
13. John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: An Overview, in
PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 1, 2 (1985).
14. Kiser, supra note 12, at 146; Petersen, supra note 12, at 277-78.
15. Principals may also impose costs on agents. For example, a principal might
withhold promised support or fail to communicate his desires clearly. See Jeff Worsham et
al., Assessing the Assumptions: A Critical Analysis of Agency Theory, 28 ADMIN. & SOC'Y
419, 435 (1997). A more comprehensive look at agency costs in the human rights system
might assess the costs imposed on agents as well as those imposed on principals. However,
this Article focuses on the costs incurred by principals in their attempts to improve the status
of human rights. The focus is justified because certain agency costs, such as an agent's lack
of information, are relatively small in the human rights arena where the principals' interests
are, at least at a basic level, fairly clear.
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In addition to conflicting interests, agents often possess
greater information or greater capability for processing information
than do their principals, resulting in information asymmetries. 16 For
example, agents know their own propensities for honesty or industry
better than do their principals. 7 In addition, agents develop expertise
and possess greater information because of their proximity to the
events affecting the principal's interests. These information
asymmetries, while not inherently detrimental, allow agents to pursue
their own interests unbeknownst to the principal or to influence the
principal's perceptions and commands by controlling the information
the principal receives. 8
Both conflicts of interest and information asymmetries may
reduce the agent's responsiveness to the principal's interests. 9
Identifying the existence of agency relationships can alert us to these
costs and to ways in which the principal might minimize them.2"
Applying an agency perspective to the international human rights
system supported by the U.N. thus promises to expose conflicts of
interest and information asymmetries within the system and to spur
exploration of ways to reduce these costs, thereby rendering the
human rights system more responsive to the individuals whose
interests it is intended to protect.
III. THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM: AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
AND AGENCY COSTS
The first step in applying an agency perspective to the
international human rights system supported by the U.N. is to identify
the agency relationships that comprise the system. This task has both
descriptive and normative aspects. That is, the agency approach finds
evidence of agency relationships by looking at the way the system
currently operates. Having found evidence of these agency
relationships and the costs they impose, agency theory suggests ways
in which these costs might be reduced. In so doing, the agency
16. See Kiser, supra note 12, at 146; Petersen, supra note 12, at 278-79; Worsham et
al., supra note 15, at 435; Pratt & Zeckhauser, supra note 13, at 3.
17. Kiser, supra note 12, at 149-50; Petersen, supra note 12, at 278-79.
18. See Worsham et al., supra note 15, at 422; Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap,
Bureaucratic Rules, Supervisor Behavior, and the Effect on Salaries in the Federal
Government, 5 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 55 (1989).
19. Kiser, supra note 12, at 146.
20. Reducing agency costs may itself be costly. These control costs may nonetheless bejustified by savings in agency costs.
[42:491
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approach provides a basis for arguing that principals and agents
within the system should view themselves and act consistently with
the obligations inherent in their agency roles.
While a multitude of agency relationships might be identified
within the U.N. human rights system, this Article focuses on three
relationships. It begins, however, by identifying the principals in the
system. The U.N. human rights system largely protects the rights of
individuals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Universal
Declaration"), for example, recognizes "the inherent dignity and...
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family," and
identifies certain individual rights "as a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations."21 The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR") build on the Universal Declaration and bind state parties
to respect or seek to realize various individual rights, such as the right
to religious freedom22 and the right to work.23 Other conventions,
such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women24 and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child,25 obligate state parties to protect the rights of individuals
belonging to certain groups. As the human rights system is designed
to protect the interests of individuals throughout the world,
individuals are properly viewed as the principals in the system.
This Article assumes that the interests of individuals within
the human rights system are uniform. Of course, even in the field of
human rights, the interests of individuals differ, and are at times
widely divergent.26 When principals' interests diverge, the outcomes
21. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 71, 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
22. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 18, para. 1,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
23. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art.
6, para. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6, 6 I.L.M. 360, 361 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR].
24. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
25. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 28 I.L.M.
1448 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
26. Cf Paul Wapner, Introductory Essay: Paradise Lost? NGOs and Global
Accountability, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 155, 159 (2002) (recognizing the absence of a "single,
global, public will" and the resulting difficulty for questions of accountability of international
actors) [hereinafter Wapner, Introductory Essay]; Paul Wapner, Defending Accountability in
NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 197, 204 (2002) (noting that there is no "universalist public")
[hereinafter Wapner, Defending Accountability].
2004]
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
produced by an agency relationship do not provide a ready measure of
whether the principals' interests have been served. Instead, agency
costs might be identified by determining whether individuals'
interests were adequately represented in the decision-making process,
without necessarily reaching the merits of the final outcome as a
matter of political choice.27 To bracket the issue of political choice
and focus instead on illustrating how an agency perspective can be
used to assess and improve the human rights system, this Article
employs the simplifying assumption of uniform principal interests.
Moreover, while recognizing that some restraints on agents' actions
and authority serve to protect against agency costs,2 8 this Article
focuses on situations in which the actions of agents violate
individuals' interests.29
After identifying individuals as the principals in the system,
the task becomes the identification of their agents. Individuals are
represented by three main agents in the U.N. human rights system:
states, which enact the declarations and enter the agreements that
further individuals' interests and which control various U.N.
organizations that deal with human rights; the U.N., which seeks to
promote human rights and which includes organizations composed of
independent experts that address human rights issues; and non-
governmental organizations ("NGOs"), which promote and monitor
human rights compliance.
A. States
Of these three agents, states are by far the most influential
players in the international human rights system." The system is
27. See Robert Howse, How to Begin to Think About the "Democratic Deficit" at the
WTO 7 (unpublished manuscript), available at http://faculty.law.umich.edu/rhowse (last
visited Oct. 20, 2003) (distinguishing between issues of agency and issues of political
choice).
28. See infra notes 39, 62.
29. As a result, determining when limitations on agents' authority are suboptimal is
beyond the scope of this Article.
30. See Martin A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations in Regional Human Rights
Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 307, 321 (1997) (recognizing states as "the center of
the traditional international legal order"); JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
27 (2d ed. 1998) (recognizing that, although individuals have obtained some recognition,
"[s]tates have traditionally been the sole subjects of international law, the only actors with
international legal standing"). This is not to suggest that intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations play an insignificant role, but only that states continue to play a
primary role.
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organized largely around states.31  States are the primary
manufacturers of and actors within the system.32 In these capacities,
states often act as agents of individuals, adopting documents such as
the Universal Declaration or the ICCPR. In the General Assembly,
states "initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose
of... assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. 33
However, states are also the actors the system seeks to
constrain.34 At its core, then, the system is based on an obvious
conflict of interest. The conflicting interests of states are most
obviously manifest through human rights violations, which are all too
common. 35  Freedom House's36 annual survey of the status of civil
and political rights in the world concluded that "at the end of 2002
there were 89 Free countries ... 55 Partly Free countries ... [and] 48
Not Free countries. ' 37 At the time of the survey, 2.718 billion people,
or 43.85 percent of the world's population, lived in "Free" countries,
"[a]pproximately 20.87 percent of the world's population, 1.293
billion persons, lived in" "Partly Free" countries, and 2.186 billion
people or 35.28 percent of the world's population lived in "Not Free"
countries.38 Regardless of the obvious difficulties in reaching these
conclusions, these figures attest to the extent to which states' interests
31. See Henkin, supra note 8, at 21-22 (explaining that states are the constituent
entities within the international political system that gives rise to international law); U.N.
CHARTER art. 110 (U.N. created through ratification by individual states).
32. The U.N. itself was created by "the peoples of the United Nations" acting through
their "respective Governments." U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
33. Id. art. 13, para. 1.
34. D'Amato, supra note 2, at 1113 (noting that states "are the 'creator-subjects' of
international law").
35. See Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 11l YALE
L.J. 1935, 1940, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1999, 2021 (2002).
36. The history, purpose, and activities of Freedom House, a U.S. non-profit
organization, are described on its website at http://www.freedomhouse.org/aboutfhi/index.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003).
37. Adrian Karatnycky, Liberty's Expansion in a Turbulent World: Thirty Years of the
Survey of Freedom, in FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2003), available at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/akessay.htm. "Free countries" are
those "in which there is broad scope for open political competition, a climate of respect for
civil liberties, significant independent civic life, and independent media." Id. "Partly Free
countries" are those "in which there is limited respect for political rights and civil
liberties .... These states also suffer from an environment of corruption, weak rule of law,
ethnic and religious strife, and often a setting in which a single political party enjoys
dominance despite the facade of limited pluralism." Id. "Not Free countries" are countries
"where basic political rights are absent and basic civil liberties were widely and
systematically denied." Id.
38. Id.
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collide with those of individuals.
Not only do conflicts of interest lead states to violate
individuals' rights, but they lead states to limit the work of
international organizations.39 For example, states sitting on the
Commission on Human Rights, the principal U.N. human rights
body,40 initially held that the Commission lacked power to respond to
complaints of human rights violations. 41  Although the Commission
reversed its position twenty years later,42 the Commission remains
crippled by the political interests of its fifty-three member states. The
political hold that states maintain on the Commission is illustrated by
the election of Libya, a prominent human rights violator, to chair the
Commission's most recent session43 and by the fact that the
Commission has never managed to adopt a resolution criticizing
China for its human rights abuses.44
Just as states may act to limit the reach of the U.N., states
attempt to limit the work of human rights NGOs by, among other
things, denying them legal status and restricting their fundraising,
dissemination of materials, and access to international fora. 45  For
39. This is not to suggest that every time a state acts to constrain an international
organization, it acts contrary to individuals' interests. There are certainly times when
constraint of an international actor advances the interests of individuals and reduces agency
costs. However, much of the resistance to the growth of international organizations has
arisen from uncertainty regarding whether international organizations will act in individuals'
interests. As previously noted, this Article does not seek to determine the precise degree of
international authority that will best serve individuals' interests, but instead focuses on the
many situations in which states' actions vis-A-vis international organizations conflict with
individuals' interests.
40. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 138 (describing the Commission on Human
Rights as "the world's single most important human rights organ"); Human Rights Watch,
Libya Confirms Why It Is Wrong for UN Rights Chair (Aug. 20, 2002), at
http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/08/libya082002.htm [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Libya
Confirms] (referring to the Commission as "the world's chief human rights body").
41. STEINER& ALSTON, supra note 8, at 611.
42. Id.
43. See Human Rights Watch, Libya Confirms, supra note 40.
44. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 634-40 (providing a case study of the
Commission's failings regarding China); see also T. Jeremy Gunn, American Exceptionalism
and Globalist Double Standards: A More Balanced Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
137, 150 (2002).
45. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA
OVERVIEW (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k3/mideast.html (last visited Oct. 22,
2003) (describing restrictions on human rights organizations); LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, THE NEGLECTED RIGHT: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (1997), available at http://www.lchr.org/pubs/descriptions/neglrt.htm
(last visited Oct. 22, 2003) [hereinafter LAWYERS COMMITTEE]; Michael H. Posner & Candy
Whittome, The Status of Human Rights NGOs, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 269, 273-81,
283-85 (1994); E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. ESCOR, 51st Sess., 49th plen. mtg. 46, U.N.
Doc. E/1996/96 (1996), available at http://www.un.org/documents/ecosoc/res/1996/
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example, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights recently reported
that Egypt, under a new registration law, denied registration to "two
well established independent human rights organizations-the New
Women's Research Center and the Land Center for Human Rights.,
46
Similarly, Human Rights Watch reports that Cuba denies legal status
to local human rights organizations, restricts the foreign travel of
human rights advocates, and bans international organizations from
conducting local investigations of human rights violations.47 While
other examples could be provided,48 these few illustrations suffice to
demonstrate that conflicting interests lead states to take many actions
inconsistent with the interests of individuals.
B. The United Nations
The U.N. Charter provides ample evidence of the U.N.'s role
as an agent of individuals. The Charter's preamble states that the
U.N. was created by "we, the people" through "our respective
Governments. 49 On its face, the U.N. was created by the peoples of
the world, the principals, through their agents, the states.5 °
Furthermore, the U.N. was designed "[t]o achieve
international co-operation.., in promoting and encouraging respect
eres1996-31.htm (allowing U.N. member states to comment on NGO applications to
participate in U.N. conferences); cf European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal
Personality of International Non-Governmental Organizations, Apr. 24, 1986, arts. 2, 4, Eur.
T.S. 124 (recognizing that states may limit the rights of NGOs when "required by essential
public interest" or if an NGO "contravenes national security, public safety, or is detrimental
to the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, or the protection of
the rights and freedoms of others; or ... jeopardises relations with another State or the
maintenance of international peace and security"); DONNELLY, supra note 30, at 11 (noting
that states violate the rights of persons belonging to NGOs).
46. Press Release, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Egypt: Human Rights
Organizations "Closed" Due to Implementation of New Law on Associations (June 11,
2003), available at http://www.lchr.org/media/2003_alerts/0611 .htm.
47. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: CUBA (2003), available at
http://hrw.org/wr2k3/americas5.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
48. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2003: NIGERIA (2003), available
at http://hrw.org/wr2k3/africa8.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2003) (noting that "[c]opies of a
book on impunity and state-sponsored violence in Nigeria, published by [the Centre for Law
Enforcement Education] and the World Organisation Against Torture, were blocked at
customs from entering Nigeria because of the book's 'perceived political undertone"');
LAWYERS COMMITTEE, supra note 45 (noting that, in India, "prior government approval is
needed before an NGO can receive foreign funds").
49. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
50. The states were themselves represented by agents in creating the U.N., as is noted in
the Preamble to the Charter. Id.
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for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all."51 The U.N.
thus seeks to advance individuals' interests. The international human
rights movement owes much of its success to the existence and efforts
of the U.N.
At the same time, the U.N. serves as "a centre for harmonizing
the actions of nations in the attainment of ... common ends,"
including the advancement of human rights. 2 The U.N. is thus both
an agent of individuals to achieve respect for human rights and a
forum for coordinating the actions of states in doing the same.
Although states are to "fulfill in good faith the [human rights]
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the [U.N.]
Charter,"53 self-interested member states often use the U.N. as a
forum to accomplish their own objectives, rendering it an agent of the
states. 4 Moreover, the U.N. depends on its member states for its
budget5 and for identification and implementation of many of its
initiatives. As a result, the interests of the U.N. are at least bifurcated.
Given these conflicting interests, it should come as no surprise
that the U.N. has been constrained in its efforts to promote human
rights in the face of violations by member states. As noted above, the
Commission on Human Rights has failed to adopt a single resolution
criticizing China for its history of human rights abuses. Similarly,
past "Secretaries-General have been very reluctant to embrace human
rights concerns actively for fear of offending governments and
jeopardizing their wider role in the promotion of international peace
and security."56  Former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali, for example, strongly opposed the creation of a High
Commissioner for Human Rights post only months before the General
51. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
52. Id. art. 1, paras. 3, 4; see also id. art. 55, para. c. ("[T]he United Nations shall
promote... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms .... ").
53. Id. art. 2, para. 2. At the same time, the U.N. Charter does not "authorize the [U.N.]
to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State."
Id. art. 2, para. 7.
54. See DONNELLY, supra note 30, at 9-10 (recognizing that the U.N. is composed of
sovereign states who represent themselves, not individuals).
55. The Charter establishes that "[t]he expenses of the [U.N.] shall be borne by the[member states] as apportioned by the General Assembly." U.N. CHARTER art. 17, para. 2.
A member state whose financial obligations to the U.N. are in arrears in an amount equal to
its last two years' obligations may not vote in the General Assembly, unless the General
Assembly "is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond [the member state's]
control." Id. art. 19.
56. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 599.
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Assembly voted to create the position.5 ' As these situations illustrate,
the actions of the U.N. are often circumscribed by political
considerations, most notably the political interests of its member
states.
However, the U.N. is not a mere puppet of its member states.
By the terms of its Charter, the U.N. possesses significant autonomy
to carry out its purposes. The U.N. as a whole is to "enjoy in the
territory of each of its [member states the] legal capacity... [and the]
privileges and immunities ... necessary for the ... fulfillment of its
purposes."" The U.N. Secretary-General and his staff are prohibited
from seeking or receiving "instructions from any government or from
any other authority external to the" U.N. and from engaging in "any
action which might reflect on their position as international officials
responsible only to the" U.N.59 Furthermore, according to the
Charter, the U.N. can expect its members to "give... every
assistance in any action [the U.N.] takes in accordance with the...
Charter."6 Member states specifically "pledge... to take joint and
separate action in co-operation with the [U.N.]" to achieve "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms."61  Although these provisions are not fully realized in
practice, they evidence that the U.N. has room to pursue its own
interests. To the extent the U.N.'s interests diverge from both those
of its member states and of individuals, its interests are trifurcated.62
C. Non-Governmental Organizations
Like the U.N. and states, NGOs also represent individuals'
interests in the human rights regime. The advent of NGOs 63 is not a
recent phenomenon, but their number, range, and influence have
57. Id.
58. U.N. CHARTER arts. 104-05.
59. Id. art. 100, para. 1. Correspondingly, member states commit "to respect the
exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and [his]
staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities." Id. art. 100,
para. 2. These prohibitions obviously did not prevent past Secretaries-General from avoiding
human rights initiatives that might be controversial with member states, as noted above.
However, they do provide the Secretary-General some autonomy to pursue U.N. goals.
60. Id. art. 2, para. 5.
61. Id. arts. 55-56.
62. The desire to prevent the U.N. from pursuing its own interests may lead individuals
to limit the delegation of authority to the U.N. See supra note 39.
63. For a discussion of various definitions of NGOs, see Olz, supra note 30, at 313-21.
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greatly expanded in recent years.64 The dramatic increase in human
rights NGOs appears to have been motivated largely by a desire to
provide a voice for the interests of individuals in the human rights
regime. That is, the creation of increasing numbers of human rights
NGOs arguably has occurred to combat agency costs imposed by the
human rights system.
Human rights NGOs clearly advance individuals' interests in
the system.65 NGOs mold international norms, agitate for new
international conventions, and participate in international meetings
regarding human rights.66  NGOs play extensive and even
institutionalized roles in the work of some U.N. bodies.67
For example, the U.N. Charter authorizes "[t]he Economic and
Social Council [("ECOSOC") to] ... make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are
concerned with matters within its competence. 68  ECOSOC has
formalized principles that guide whether an NGO obtains consultative
status and at which of three levels-general, special, or rostered.69
Depending on their level of consultative status, NGOs may participate
in defining ECOSOC's agenda,70 attend public ECOSOC meetings,71
64. Debora Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for
Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 171, 171-72 (2002)
(documenting the dramatic increase in the number and influence of NGOs); Posner &
Whittome, supra note 45, at 269-70, 287 (noting the proliferation of NGOs in recent years);
Nowrot, supra note 10, at 581-86 (summarizing the history of NGOs).
65. NGOs are also widely perceived as advancing the interests of individuals. Wapner,
Introductory Essay, supra note 26, at 156.
66. ANNE MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND
CHANGING HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 18-20 (2001) (discussing Amnesty International's impact
on international human rights norms); DONNELLY, supra note 30, at 11 (noting the impact on
U.N. initiatives of Amnesty International's anti-torture campaigns); Nowrot, supra note 10,
at 579, 591-94; Posner & Whittome, supra note 45, at 275; Cynthia Price Cohen, The Role of
Nongovernmental Organizations in the Drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
12 HUM. RTS. Q. 136 (1990). Guidelines governing NGO participation in the preparation for,
advent of, and implementation of international conferences are found in E. S.C. Res. 1996/31,
supra note 45, 41-54. Although participation by NGOs in U.N. conferences is welcome,
in light "of the intergovernmental nature of the conference[s]," NGO participation "does not
entail a negotiating role." Id. T 50. However, NGOs participate "by influencing state parties
to formal negotiations, in some cases through delegation capture." Spiro, supra note 11, at
166.
67. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 9, at 44; Nowrot, supra note 10, at 625-26; Klaus
Hifner, Non-Governmental Organizations, in 2 UNITED NATIONS: LAW, POLICIES AND
PRACTICE 927, 928-34 (Rudiger Wolfrum & Christiane Philipp eds., 1995) (providing a
history of NGOs' relations with the U.N.).
68. U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
69. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 45, 7 22-23.
70. Id. 28, 62.
71. Id. 29.
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and submit written and oral statements to the Council."2 NGOs with
consultative status have similar rights with regard to the Council's
subsidiary organs.73 In addition, all consulting NGOs may counsel
the U.N. Secretariat on matters of mutual interest. Moreover, the
Secretary-General may provide consulting NGOs certain services,
such as "[a]rrangement of informal discussions on matters of special
interest to groups or organizations," "[u]se of the [U.N.] libraries,"
"[p]rovision of accommodation for conferences or smaller meetings
of consultative organizations on the work of' ECOSOC, and
"[a]ppropriate seating arrangements and facilities for obtaining
documents during public meetings of the General Assembly dealing
with matters in the economic, social and related fields."74 However,
in no case are NGOs accorded "the same rights of participation as are
accorded to States not members of the Council."75  Nor are
ECOSOC's arrangements with NGOs to "be such as to overburden
the Council or transform it from a body for coordination of policy and
action... into a general forum for discussion."76 Nonetheless, the
interaction with NGOs is designed not only to provide expert
resources to ECOSOC, but also "to enable international, regional,
subregional and national organizations that represent important
elements of public opinion to express their views."77  These
arrangements thus open a door through which individual interests
may find manifestation in the deliberations and actions of U.N.
bodies.78
72. Id. 30-32.




77. Id. 20. Thus, organizations that receive
consultative status should be limited to those whose activities in [relevant]
fields... qualify them to make a significant contribution to the work of the
Council and should ... as far as possible reflect in a balanced way the major
viewpoints or interests in these fields in all areas and regions of the world.
Id. Similarly, organizations who receive the highest level of consultative status should both
work "with most of the activities of the Council and its subsidiary bodies and... demonstrate
to the... Council that they have substantive and sustained contributions to make to the
achievement of the objectives of the United Nations in [relevant] fields." In addition, such
NGOs should be "closely involved with the economic and social life of the peoples of the
areas they represent and" have considerable membership that "is broadly representative of
major segments of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world."
Id. 22.
78. See Olz, supra note 30, at 328 (recognizing that because "NGOs represent particular
constituencies, their involvement [with inter-governmental organizations] can.., be seen
as. . . 'democratizing' inter-governmental processes by expressing the otherwise unheard
needs and concerns of the populations of the member States"); Wapner, Defending
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NGOs play a similarly significant role in influencing state
behavior and creating international custom.79 NGOs mobilize public
pressure and directly contact government and international officials
concerning problems.8" NGOs make a monumental difference by
monitoring and publicizing the human rights practices of states.8
Indeed, it has been said that the U.N. human rights program would
collapse without the information provided by NGOs.82 NGOs are able
to "submit information to various thematic rapporteurs and treaty-
monitoring bodies."83  NGOs also file complaints for victims of
human rights abuses or "provide legal assistance and expertise to
individual claimants" within international or domestic adjudicatory
systems.84 In addition, NGOs engage in campaigns to educate
principals regarding their rights.85
The list of NGO activities that promote individuals' interests
could be expanded. Human rights NGOs have become truly
prominent players in advancing individual interests within the U.N.
human rights system. However, while NGOs have arisen to increase
Accountability, supra note 26, at 197 (NGOs attempt "to bring the aspirations of ordinary
people to the international agenda"); Council of Europe Resolution (93) 38 on Relations
between the Council of Europe and International Non-Governmental Organisations, Oct. 18,
1993, pmbl., available at http://cm.coe.int/ta/res/1993/93X38.htm (assuming that NGOs
represent the interests of individual citizens).
79. Nowrot, supra note 10, at 595.
80. Id. at 594-95. Indeed, the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 requires
diplomatic personnel of the United States to, "as appropriate, seek out and maintain contacts
with religious and human rights nongovernmental organizations, with the consent of those
organizations, including receiving reports and updates from such organizations and, when
appropriate, investigating such reports." International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. §
6412(c)(2) (1999).
81. Nowrot, supra note 10, at 580, 596-97; Posner & Whittome, supra note 45, at 275-
76; Olz, supra note 30, at 329; Hiifner, supra note 67, at 933. In addition, human rights
NGOs publicize the work of international organizations. See E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note
45, 3 (requiring consulting NGOs to "undertake to support the work of the United Nations
and to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with [their] own
aims and purposes and the nature and scope of [their] competence and activities"); see also
Council of Europe Res. (93) 38, supra note 78, arts. 5(b)-(c), 7 (requiring NGOs in
consultative status to "undertake to... give maximum publicity to the initiatives or
achievements of the Council of Europe in their own field(s) of competence" and to report on
their efforts to do so).
82. Posner & Whittome, supra note 45, at 275; see also BAYEFSKY, supra note 9, at 42-
43 (describing the dependence of U.N. treaty bodies on NGO information).
83. Posner & Whittome, supra note 45, at 287 n.66; see also BAYEFSKY, supra note 9,
at 42-44; Gunn, supra note 44, at 149 n.44 (noting that "NGOs are invited to comment on the
human rights practices of the participating states" in the annual review and implementation
meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).
84. Olz, supra note 30, at 327, 329 n.79.
85. Id. at 329.
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the representation of principals' interests at the international level,
NGOs also impose agency costs. Whether an NGO is organized as a
membership organization or otherwise, it is typically not financially
independent.86 As a result, NGOs are beholden to their members
and/or donors for financial support.87  This dependency is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it can provide individuals an avenue
for constraining NGOs' actions.88 On the other hand, it raises the
specter that wealth, rather than the interests of individuals, will
control the agendas of NGOs.
Even in light of their financial dependencies, NGOs face little
accountability to individuals.89 This is due, in part, to the fact that
individuals do not track NGOs closely to determine whether NGOs
are representing their interests.90 Any attempt to track NGOs is
hampered by the absence of clear measurements for evaluating NGO
performance 9 and by the lack of reporting by many NGOs. 92 Nor is
there a sense that individuals effectively can alter the direction of
NGOs. "Most NGO leaders are appointed rather than elected ....
If a principal were dissatisfied with an NGO's performance, she
would likely be unable to effect a significant change in NGO
86. Wapner, Defending Accountability, supra note 26, at 201.
87. See id. at 201-02; Spiro, supra note 11, at 163-64. NGOs may also be beholden to
individuals for support with letter-writing campaigns or other efforts. Wapner, Defending
Accountability, supra note 26, at 201. Like financial dependency on members, this
dependency can render NGOs more responsive to individuals' interests.
88. See Wapner, Defending Accountability, supra note 26, at 201; Spiro, supra note 11,
at 163-64. Because NGOs tend to focus on limited issues, individuals may be able to
monitor NGOs' actions more easily than they can the actions of governmental representatives
who act on a wider variety of issues. Spiro, supra note 11, at 165. Similarly, because
individuals do not have to wait until an election, as they do with governments, to withdraw
their support, individuals can readily employ termination of support as a mode of constraint.
Wapner, Defending Accountability, supra note 26, at 201. However, individuals' withdrawal
of support is likely to be less coordinated than an election, reducing its potential impact.
Moreover, for withdrawal to serve as an effective constraint, individuals must monitor NGOs
sufficiently to know when there is cause to withdraw support. As noted in the text, individual
monitoring is relatively spare, perhaps in part because an individual's "material commitment
[to an NGO] may not exceed nominal annual dues." Spiro, supra note 11, at 163.
89. Wapner, Introductory Essay, supra note 26, at 157-58 (noting the relative lack of
mechanisms for holding NGOs accountable).
90. See Spiro, supra note 11, at 163 ("The vast majority of... individual members [in
membership NGOs], safe to say, are passive ... [and] are unlikely to monitor complete
organizational agendas .... ).
91. Spar & Dail, supra note 64, at 173-78.
92. Id. at 173 ("NGOs have not yet developed customary mechanisms for reporting on
their activities.").
93. Wapner, Introductory Essay, supra note 26, at 157. Even in membership
organizations, the leadership generally is "not formally elected or directly answerable to
individual members." Spiro, supra note 11, at 163.
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governance or operation.
While NGOs who wish to obtain consultative status with the
ECOSOC must satisfy certain requirements that might make them
more transparent and responsive to individuals' interests,94 additional
requirements imposed on NGOs often render NGOs beholden to the
U.N. rather than to individuals. For example, ECOSOC requires that
"[t]he aims and purposes of" consulting NGOs conform to "the spirit,
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations" and that
these NGOs "undertake to support the work of the United Nations and
to promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance
with [the NGOs'] own aims and purposes and scope of [their]
competence and activities."95  NGOs with general or special
consultative status must submit a report every four years regarding
"the support [the organization has] given to the work of the United
Nations." 96 Similarly,
[o]rganizations to be accorded special consultative
status because of their interest in the field of human
rights [are to] pursue the goals of promotion and
protection of human rights in accordance with the
spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.97
An NGO's consultative status may be suspended or withdrawn if the
NGO "clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations
including unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against
Member States of the United Nations incompatible with those
purposes and principles." 98
Although these requirements will be beneficial in almost all
instances, at the margin, they might pressure NGOs to mirror rather
than scrutinize the policies and preferences of the U.N., some of
which might be inconsistent with those of the NGOs' members or of
individuals at large.99 More likely, just as NGOs might short-change
94. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 45, 10-13.
95. Id. IT 2-3; see also Olz, supra note 30, at 329.
96. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, supra note 45, 61 (c).
97. Id. 25.
98. Id. 57(a). Suspension or withdrawal may also result if, in a three year period, "an
organization [does] not make any positive or effective contribution to the work of the United
Nations and, in particular, of [ECOSOC] or its commissions or other subsidiary organs." Id.
57(c).
99. See Wapner, Defending Accountability, supra note 26, at 203 (asserting that "NGOs
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individual interests to curry favor with the U.N., NGOs might find
themselves intertwined with or solicitous of states, particularly if an
NGO is attempting to cultivate influence with states or assumes
capacity building functions traditionally performed by states, such as
training judges.'00
NGOs may also find that in an effort to appear even-handed
they focus on problems in countries like the United States that may be
less severe than problems in other countries. That is, NGOs may be
more preoccupied with their own credibility or publicity than with the
most pressing concerns of the individuals whom they intend to serve.
This is not to suggest that countries engaged in widespread
compliance should be immune from scrutiny or that such scrutiny
might not advance human rights norms. But NGO resources might be
spent on such countries to the neglect of more serious problems in an
attempt to advance NGO interests. Similarly, NGOs may be driven
by the need for immediate and visible gains where a more long-term
strategy might better advance the principals' interests. In short, while
NGOs do much to advance individual interests within the human
rights system, they also impose often-overlooked agency costs as a
result of conflicting interests.
D. Information Asymmetries
Just as each of the three agents in the human rights system has
interests that conflict in varying degrees with the interests of
individuals, so each agent has greater access to information regarding
human rights than do individuals. In and of itself, the existence of
information asymmetries does not prejudice individuals. In fact, the
ability of individuals to rely on agents to obtain information may
create valuable efficiencies. As noted above, NGOs' efforts to obtain
and publicize information have done much to advance human rights
protection without much effort on the part of individuals. But
information asymmetries open a door for agents to pursue interests
that conflict with their principals' preferences without detection. It is
in this context that information asymmetries become prejudicial.
Thus, it is necessary to be aware of information asymmetries and the
organize and certainly present themselves in particular ways to meet [ECOSOC's] ... criteria
of evaluation").
100. See Spar & Dail, supra note 64, at 180; Wapner, Introductory Essay, supra note 26,
at 159; Wapner, Defending Accountability, supra note 26, at 203 (noting that NGOs that wish
to influence states by becoming "insiders or at least partners in policy formation ... must act
in certain ways that win states' approval").
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risk they pose.
Information asymmetries are prominent in the human rights
context. Most individuals lack detailed knowledge of the various
rights guaranteed under international human rights instruments, let
alone of the workings of NGOs or of the U.N."0 1 Moreover, states,
the U.N., and NGOs generally possess greater resources to spend on
monitoring human rights events than do isolated individuals. In fact,
human rights NGOs may have greater resources to spend monitoring
human rights than some of the governments that they observe.
NGOs, the U.N., and states also have greater access to other countries
to gather information. International NGOs may have employees,
volunteers, and affiliates in multiple states. States maintain
diplomatic offices and intelligence services that gather information
about local conditions. Various U.N. bodies can request information
from governments, conduct on-site visits, and monitor complaints
about country practices.102
Similarly, each of these agents has greater access to U.N. fora
where human rights issues are discussed and decided. The fact that
some of the U.N. procedures for addressing human rights concerns
are confidential renders the asymmetry even greater and sharpens the
threat to individuals' interests. To illustrate, consider the Human
Rights Commission's handling of a complaint of human rights abuses
by Saudi Arabia. Under ECOSOC Resolution 1503, the Commission
is authorized to consider certain "situations which appear to reveal a
consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human
rights.' 0 3  Aside from the names of countries who are, or are no
longer, under consideration, the Commission's deliberations
regarding such situations are to remain confidential, unless the
Commission decides to make recommendations to ECOSOC.
However, information is often leaked, as occurred in this case.'
101. Awareness of international human rights guarantees and mechanisms is
undoubtedly increasing. A colleague of mine shared with me a humorous anecdote in this
vein. Using the Internet, his eleven-year-old son tracked down a copy of the Convention on
the Rights of the Child to persuade his mother that he had the right to forego a certain
activity. He was disappointed to learn that the U.S. was not a signatory to the Convention
and that he could not find a number to the U.N. in the local phone book.
102. See, e.g., STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 611-15, 619-22, 641-42, 706, 738-
39.
103. E.S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. ESCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. IA, 5, U.N. Doc.
E/4832/Add. 18 (1970).
104. Id. 8; STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 616. Consistent disclosure of
information may reduce, but will not eliminate, the asymmetry created by confidential
proceedings to the extent disclosure occurs after the fact and leaves questions about the
authenticity of the information disclosed.
[42:491
2004] AGENCY COSTS IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 511
The complaint against the Saudi government alleged
systematic political detention, indefinite incommunicado detention
without charge, torture, and execution without due process.'0 5 Saudi
Arabia responded to the complaint in a 17-page report in which it
challenged but did not supplement the statistics in the complaint and
characterized the complaint "as exaggerated, extreme, groundless,
inaccurate, selective, ambiguous, and distorted."' 6 In a hearing that
lasted approximately one hour, the Commission heard Saudi Arabia
"affirm [its] faith in human rights and its confidence in the UN's
human rights mechanisms," "indicate that [it] was considering
contributing more money to a UN Trust Fund for the Victims of
Torture," and assert "that it had respected international standards and
had sought to improve the functioning of its judicial system.' 10 7
Several governments then welcomed Saudi Arabia's
cooperativeness and recommended dismissal of the complaint, while
a small number of governments posed questions arising from Saudi
Arabia's report. The Saudi government noted the questions posed
and the Commission discontinued the case.'0 8 The confidentiality of
the procedure, though ultimately breached in this case, assisted states,
acting through the U.N., in countenancing human rights violations by
Saudi Arabia in derogation of the interests of individuals. As the
situation with Saudi Arabia illustrates, information asymmetries allow
agents to act contrary to principals' interests with less threat of
detection and therefore with greater impunity.
IV. THE BENEFITS OF AN AGENCY PERSPECTIVE
As the above discussion illustrates, applying an agency
perspective to the human rights system supported by the U.N.
facilitates the identification of problems that diminish the regime's
responsiveness to individual interests. In particular, an agency
perspective points us toward conflicts of interest and problematic
information asymmetries that might otherwise go undetected. An
agency perspective also leads to two additional advances.
105. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 616-17.
106. Id. at 617.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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A. Shifting the Paradigm
First, an agency approach suggests that the human rights
system ought to be conceptualized through a different paradigm in
which the individual is the central focus of the system, and states,
intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs are expected to be
responsive to individuals' interests. While this perspective might
seem uncontroversial on some level, it represents a significant
departure from the current default view. The default view too often
conceives of states as the heart of the system, responsive to the norms
of the broader international community. The international community
lacks broad compulsory means for imposing its norms, leaving states
with significant room to pursue their own interests. Likewise,
intergovernmental organizations and NGOs, while perceived as more
friendly to individuals, are not always viewed as responsible to the
individual. Nor are their conflicts of interest always recognized.
Changing perspective may both change expectations regarding the
roles of these institutions and raise those expectations. Changing
perspective may also empower individuals by educating them to
monitor and influence the actions of agents within the system. Thus,
mere recognition of the individual as the principal within the human
rights system would represent a significant advance for human rights.
B. Reducing Agency Costs
Second, agency theory focuses attention on the reduction of
agency costs, suggesting ways in which the human rights system
might be improved. The costs imposed by each of the three main
agency relationships are amenable to reduction. Identifying possible
ways of reducing these costs has important implications for how the
human rights system ought to be molded. This Article highlights
these possibilities in broad strokes, illustrating the types of proposals
an agency perspective might yield without detailing every such
possibility. In so doing, this Article attempts to persuade scholars,
policy makers, and activists of the value of an agency perspective in
formulating future improvements.
1. Bonding
An agent's pursuit of interests that conflict with its principal's
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may be constrained through "bonding," or the adoption of detailed
rules, rather than broad standards governing the agent's conduct.'0 9
Bonding is not new in international human rights. For example, an
important part of the work of the Human Rights Committee involves
interpreting the provisions of the ICCPR." Similarly, the increase in
human rights treaties since World War II has produced significant
bonding. In the human rights context, bonding reduces the ability of
states to minimize or hide human rights violations under self-serving
formulations of vague rights. Conversely, bonding makes it easier for
principals and other stakeholders to identify, publicize, and condemn
states' human rights violations. Further, to the extent that human
rights are concretely defined, national court systems might be used to
enforce human rights, increasing authoritative adjudication of rights
while reducing the risk of thereby destroying uniform international
definition of rights. Given the prospects of bonding for reducing
agency costs, human rights advocates and institutions might continue
to flesh out rights, such as the right to adequate housing, to facilitate
monitoring and promotion of international human rights."11
2. Heightened Participation by Principals
Both conflicts of interest and the risks of information
asymmetries may be constrained through heightened participation by
principals in the human rights system. Individual participation might
be increased in a number of ways. First, individuals might be
afforded enhanced opportunities to bring complaints for human rights
violations." 2  Currently, for example, individuals may submit
complaints alleging various human rights violations by states to the
109. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals and Legal Unification-The Agency
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 333, 336 (2002) (discussing bonding as an option for constraining
agency costs incurred in delegating authority to international tribunals).
110. See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 731-37 (describing the Committee's
practice of promulgating General Comments, and collecting General Comments that illustrate
the Committee's efforts to detail the meanings of various ICCPR provisions).
111. ICESCR, supra note 23, art. 11, para. 1.
112. See, e.g., Gibney, supra note 9, at 55-56 (proposing the creation of an International
Civil Court to hear individual claims against individual and state violators of human rights).
States are not the only actors who need to be held accountable for violating individuals'
interests, as is evidenced by Charlotte Raab, Sexual Abuse of Child Refugees Increasing, UN
Says, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 9, 2002, available at http://wwww.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.
nsf/s/159AB51035531A3849256BB500098817 (acknowledging evidence "of sexual
exploitation of refugee children by staff of local and international non-governmental
organizations, including UN agencies"). The issue of accountability for international
organizations receives book-length treatment in KARL WELLENS, REMEDIES AGAINST
INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (2002).
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U.N., but the effectiveness of doing so is fairly limited, in part
because of resource constraints and administrative inefficiencies that
could be minimized.'13 Improved and increased adjudication of
individual complaints, at both national and international levels,
provides an obvious way to hold agents accountable for elevating
their own interests above those of their principals. Active and
streamlined adjudicative processes can also deter agents from
pursuing conflicting interests.
Second, individuals might be allowed greater participation in
the creation of human rights instruments. Individuals have some
oversight of the creation of these instruments to the extent that
ratification requires the approval of their representatives.114 However,
the oversight provided by ratification is extremely limited.
Ratification is itself accomplished through agents. These agents
cannot alter the proposed instrument and may be unable to ratify
something less than the entire instrument.1 5 Ratification thus cannot
substitute for involvement in the original negotiations.
Opening the negotiation process to formal participation by
individuals would hopelessly clog drafting efforts. It might also
skew, rather than increase, the responsiveness of the drafting system
as outliers (with respect to both preferences and resources) might be
the only ones to participate. The participation of individuals might be
more effectively achieved if individuals did not participate in the
process in person, but were allowed to comment on proposed human
rights instruments, as occurs in the administrative rule-making
process in the United States. While opening the drafting process to
individual notice and comment might also seem overwhelming, the
dynamic has been manageable in the United States and presumably
could be handled on an international level as well. Comments could
be reviewed by working groups and reasons for their adoption or
rejection explicitly recorded. Requiring explicit consideration and
113. See, e.g., STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 8, at 740-41; BAYEFSKY, supra note 9, at
25-27, 29-30, 105-13 (2001) (discussing the workload and processes of various U.N. bodies
that receive individual communications, proposed ways to increase effective handling of
communications, and progress made in the handling of communications); Anne Bayefsky,
Ending Bias in the Human Rights System, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A27 (noting that few
of the more than 100,000 annual letters to the U.N. regarding human rights violations
actually reach one of the committees that might be able to hear the complaint due to such
things "as a lack of clear guidelines about directing mail to the proper desk" and "the
insufficient number of staff lawyers who could help transform complaints into viable legal
cases").
114. See Howse, supra note 27, at 6.
115. See id. at 8. The treaty creating the ICC, for example, permits no reservations.
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 120.
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disposition of comments would increase the ability of individuals to
monitor their agents' judgments, a benefit that would attach even if
the comment process were open to and dominated by NGOs. Even if
notice and comment were not implemented, negotiators might, at a
minimum, be required to keep the public more informed of the course
of negotiations in order to provide individuals greater opportunity to
promote their interests through their governments during
developmental stages."
16
Alternatively, states might allow their citizens directly to elect
their representatives to treaty formation conventions. Such
representatives would then feel accountable to citizens rather than
states." 7 Moreover, states would then face greater pressure to adopt
the instruments created by these representatives or at least to openly
weigh individuals' interests in the instruments against other interests
such as preserving sovereignty.
Of course, many states do not elect government officials. As a
result, the system would not be perfect. However, the number of
democratic states is high. Freedom House estimates that at the end of
2002, 121 of the 192 states in the world qualified as electoral
democracies." 8 Among these states, constitutional or other changes
might be necessary to create the representative's office. Thus, the
possibility of such a system is admittedly remote. However, if it were
to succeed, it would have obvious benefits.
In addition to those mentioned above, the election of human
rights representatives in democratic states might fuel the desire and
conviction of citizens in non-democratic states to press for increased
political rights. At a minimum, the election of human rights
representatives in some countries would create a highly public
reminder of the need for international pressure to motivate non-
democratic states to respect the political rights of their own citizens.
Such publicity could have a significant impact.
116. See Howse, supra note 27, at 10-11.
117. Where representatives to conventions are appointed by elected officials, there is
arguably a degree of accountability to individuals. However, even in these situations,
representatives are likely to feel greater accountability to their governments.
118. Karatnycky, supra note 37 ("The political map of the world at the end of 2002
showed 121 electoral democracies among the world's 192 states (63 percent)."); see also
Freedom House, Electoral Democracies, in FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2003
(2003), at http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/democracies.pdf.
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3. Publicity
Indeed, publicity is one of the most effective ways to improve
human rights compliance, in part because it minimizes information
asymmetries." 9 As noted, states, the U.N., and NGOs possess far
greater information and access to information than do individuals.
The advance and spread of communications technology undoubtedly
will continue to increase individuals' access to human rights
information. Individuals' access to information regarding U.N.
activities and the human rights practices of states has likewise been
improved in dramatic ways by the efforts of NGOs. The media has
also been fairly active in reporting on states' human rights practices.
By contrast, the media's coverage of human rights activities at the
U.N. has been less pervasive.12 ° Widespread adoption of the view
advanced in this Article-that states, the U.N., and NGOs are agents
of individuals-might inspire greater media scrutiny of the U.N.'s
human rights activities as well as greater oversight of NGOs.
At present, additional scrutiny of the U.N. and of the states
that the U.N. evaluates would be hindered by the confidentiality of
certain U.N. procedures for addressing human rights abuses, such as
the Commission on Human Rights' section 1503 procedure, discussed
above.' 2' While a guarantee of confidentiality may have been
necessary to attract state participation in the early days of the U.N.
and thus arguably benefited individuals, extensive confidentiality now
appears anachronistic and, on balance, detrimental. International
pressure to respect human rights or, at a minimum, to submit to some
scrutiny of human rights practices, is likely sufficient to keep some
states from boycotting U.N. human rights procedures in the absence
of complete confidentiality. As a result, the practice of confidentiality
should be minimized.
To the extent that states and the U.N. have a legitimate interest
in the confidentiality of certain information or proceedings, a more
limited release of information might be crafted. Preferably, such a
release of information would occur automatically. At a minimum,
119. Cf David H. Moore, A Signaling Theory of Human Rights Compliance, 97 Nw. U.
L. REv. 879, 909 (2003) (noting how publicity increases states' incentives to comply with
human rights).
120. See BAYEFSKY, supra note 9, at 96 (noting that the U.N. human rights "treaty bodies
have a poor record of drawing media attention to significant results of their deliberations,"
though placing the blame and the responsibility for improvement with U.N. bodies).
121. See supra Part Il.D; see also BAYEFSKY, supra note 9, at 32-33 (discussing the
confidentiality of various Human Rights Committee follow-up procedures and
recommending increased transparency).
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individuals and organizations should have access to non-protected
information through a procedure similar to that created by the United
States' Freedom of Information Act.122 Such access would enhance
individuals' ability to monitor their agents, whether personally or
through watchdogs like the media.
4. Requirements for NGOs
While the above suggestions largely focus on states and the
U.N., the agency costs imposed by NGOs, though perhaps slighter,
are also containable. NGOs might be rendered more responsive to
individual interests through exploitation of certain prerequisites for
participation in U.N. conferences and with U.N. committees.1 23 As
noted, ECOSOC already imposes requirements on NGOs who apply
for consultative status. For example, ECOSOC requires that an NGO
have "a democratically adopted constitution. . . which... provide[s]
for the determination of policy by a conference, congress or other
representative body" and "a representative structure and...
appropriate mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall
exercise effective control over its policies and actions through the
exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and
transparent decision-making processes.1 24  In addition, an NGO
seeking consultative status must reveal to ECOSOC's Committee on
Non-Governmental Organizations the amount and sources of
voluntary contributions it receives.1 25  Similarly, an NGO lacking
consultative status that seeks to participate in an international
conference convened by the U.N. is to include in its application the
organization's annual report or equivalent, information regarding
relevant programs and activities the NGO carries out, "a list of
financial sources and contributions" to the NGO, "[a] list of members
of the governing body," a summary of the NGO's membership, and a
copy of the organization's by-laws and/or constitution.
126
The information from these NGO applications, however, is not
made public. Publication of this information would expand
122. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2003).
123. For the suggestion that more substantive requirements, such as non-discrimination
in employment, could be imposed on NGOs as a condition of obtaining consultative status,
see Nowrot, supra note 10, at 640. Alternatively, such requirements could be imposed by
regional organizations or by an umbrella NGO. Id.
124. E.S.C. Res. 1996/3 1, supra note 45, 10, 12.
125. Id. 13.
126. Id. 44.
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individuals' ability to monitor and evaluate NGOs. Broader
enforcement of ECOSOC's requirements for democratic
accountability would also increase the opportunity for principals to
influence NGOs.
Moreover, NGOs might be required to publish reports to the
general public regarding their activities and positions at the U.N. and
elsewhere. 27  While certain formal presentations and written
submissions from NGOs are included in U.N. records, public
reporting by NGOs would facilitate efforts to track NGO activities by
individual NGOs and could disclose informal actions not included in
U.N. records. 128
Finally, while it has been suggested that NGOs should be
provided with an international legal status, 129 rather than simply
remain subject to the laws of their state of incorporation, 3 ' agency
theory suggests that international legal status might render NGOs
more independent but less responsive to individual interests. While
state-based legal status exposes NGOs to the threat of undue influence
from self-interested governments, that same status provides a means
for citizens to influence how NGOs are organized, leaving open the
possibility that individuals might regulate NGOs to be more
responsive to individuals' interests. Similarly, while it has been
suggested that NGOs be permitted to participate formally in U.N.
decision making, an agency perspective suggests that such a change
would render NGOs less responsive to individuals, as NGOs'
authority would then derive from their institutional status rather than
their representation of individuals' human rights interests.' 3'
V. CONCLUSION
As this Article illustrates, the international human rights
system is productively viewed as a network of agency relationships
127. See Spar & Dail, supra note 64, at 181 (arguing that NGOs can increase their
accountability through public reporting).
128. See Spiro, supra note 11, at 162 (acknowledging that "NGOs now participate in
international negotiations in hallways or through state surrogates").
129. Id. at 167; Nowrot, supra note 10, at 580, 600-14.
130. Just as consulting NGOs are subject to regulation by international organizations,
"NGOs are subject to the legal order of the State of incorporation, no matter whether they are
national, regional, or universal in scope." Olz, supra note 30, at 324.
131. See Spiro, supra note 11, at 162, 166-69. But cf id. at 167 (arguing that major
NGOs "would have to answer to their lesser counterparts" in order to enjoy the right "to
represent broad non-state interests").
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between the individuals whose interests the system is designed to
protect and three main agents: states, the U.N., and NGOs. Viewing
the system through the lens of agency theory helps identify the costs
these relationships impose and suggests ways these costs might be
minimized. At the same time, the agency lens focuses attention on
the interests of individuals, shifting the state-centered paradigm. An
agency approach thus makes a significant conceptual and practical
contribution to the advancement of international human rights.
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